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Selective Learning: China, the CGIAR, 
and Global Agricultural Science 
in Flux*
Xiuli Xu,1 Lídia Cabral2 and Yingdan Cao3
Abstract This article analyses the interaction between China 
and the CGIAR (formerly the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research) since the 1970s, exploring the formation of 
China’s modern agricultural science capability and its approach 
towards learning. While China was previously regarded and 
treated as a recipient of international scientific expertise, it is 
now a more equal partner and contributor, with capacity to 
provide funds, support exchange programmes for scientists, 
and collaborate in building laboratories and joint research 
programmes. Some of these now extend beyond the CGIAR 
system and are creating new platforms for scientific collaboration 
and knowledge production in the South. By offering an illustration 
of China’s ‘selective learning’ approach, emphasising self-reliance 
and pragmatism in its engagement with the CGIAR, this article 
feeds into broader debates on how China contributes to global 
development knowledge and learning.
Keywords China, CGIAR, international agricultural research, 
selective learning, South–South. 
1 Introduction
There is a long history of interaction between China’s agricultural 
science and technology systems and global development 
knowledge platforms such as the CGIAR (formerly the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research). 
Yet, insufficient attention has been given to the history of these 
relations and how they have shaped China’s own capability and 
identity in the field of agricultural science. This article traces the 
history of China–CGIAR relations over a period of 50 years and 
explores how these have evolved over time. While China was 
previously regarded and treated as a recipient of international 
expertise, it is now a partner and contributor to the CGIAR, with 
capacity to provide funds, support exchange programmes for 
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scientists, and collaborate in building joint laboratories and 
research programmes involving other Southern partners. By 
documenting the changing relationship between China and 
the CGIAR, the article offers an illustration of China’s ‘selective 
learning’, with its emphasis on self-reliance and pragmatic 
development. This feature of China’s development cooperation is 
relevant to the international community, particularly its partners in 
the global South.
The article draws on a review of secondary literature and 
semi-structured interviews with key informants in China, conducted 
between 2019 and 2021. The team interviewed 28 agricultural 
scientists, policy researchers, and managers, among whom 
15 individuals were working at CGIAR centres and their partners in 
China. Secondary literature comprised academic papers, reports, 
and archival material retrieved from the CGIAR webpage. 
The article is organised into six sections. Section 2 provides a 
historical overview of the CGIAR system, after which Section 3 
considers China’s international engagements and outlines its 
‘selective learning’ approach. Section 4 describes the historical 
trajectory of China’s relations with the CGIAR system. Section 5 
explores three modalities of interaction: germplasm exchanges, 
training of talent, and institutionalised platforms for collaboration. 
Section 6 concludes by discussing how China’s selective learning 
is now part of development knowledge networks in the global 
South. 
2 A brief historical overview of the CGIAR system
The CGIAR system was established in 1971, building on 
the experiences with international germplasm exchange, 
collaborative research, and training programmes involving 
American scientists and philanthropic organisations, such as 
the Rockefeller and Ford foundations. Byerlee and Dubin (2009) 
highlight the significance of the Inter-American Food Crop 
Improvement Program and the creation of four international 
agricultural research centres (IARCs) in the 1960s: the International 
Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines, the International 
Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) in Mexico, and 
the international institutes for tropical agriculture in Colombia 
(CIAT) and Nigeria (IITA). 
The perceived success of these centres fuelled interest in 
scaling up. The World Bank played a leading role in establishing 
the CGIAR as a ‘loose group of initially 17 member countries, 
international organizations and foundations for funding 
agricultural research’ (Byerlee and Dubin 2009: 456).4 Additional 
centres were created over the years and CGIAR membership 
expanded geographically. China officially joined in 1984, although 
connections between Chinese scientists and IARCs started earlier. 
Today, the CGIAR comprises 15 IARCs.
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Since its establishment, the CGIAR has focused on supporting 
developing countries to adopt modern agriculture technology 
and roll out the Green Revolution (CGIAR 1971). The development 
of modern technology involved two core competences: 
international germplasm exchange and training. Germplasm 
enhancement was regarded as the ‘backbone of the Centers 
[sic.] success and impact’ and where the IARCs’ comparative 
advantages laid (Anderson 1998: 9). Added together, CGIAR 
centres hold the largest collection of crop germplasm in the world 
(Dalrymple 2008). Furthermore, investment in training helped to 
develop an esprit de corps (Anderson 1998; Byerlee and Dubin 
2009), a defining mark for a mission-oriented institution.
In the field of agricultural science and technology, the CGIAR 
established itself as the leading source for global public goods 
(Dalrymple 2008) through training and ‘open source collaboration’ 
in the form of germplasm exchange and knowledge sharing 
(Byerlee and Dubin 2009). The centralisation of ‘fundamental 
research’ and germplasm collections in IARCs was seen as key 
to ensuring efficiencies through economies of scale and scope in 
knowledge production (Byerlee and Lynam 2020).
Though global in scope, links to developing countries’ research 
systems provided the ground where technologies could be 
tested and ultimately applied. Yet, because of their stance as 
autonomous non-governmental entities, the CGIAR centres 
presumably avoided national ‘political and bureaucratic 
interference in science’ (ibid.: 2). 
Throughout the 1990s, the creation of additional centres 
broadened the scope and geographical presence of the CGIAR. 
New centres for water, fish, forestry, and agroforestry were 
established and natural resource management became more 
prominent. But while the system widened and became more 
complex, funding did not follow suit, reflecting a broader decline 
of agricultural official development assistance (Eicher 2004). 
Nominal funding to the CGIAR declined in real terms during the 
1990s, becoming also restricted or earmarked (World Bank 2003). 
The increase in restricted funding is thought to have transformed 
‘the CGIAR’s authorizing environment from being science-driven 
to being donor-driven, and a shift in the System from producing 
global and regional public goods toward providing national 
and local services’ (ibid.: 3). The reduced focus on enhancing 
crop productivity, seen as the system’s core competence and 
comparative advantage, was questioned (ibid.). 
Concerns over the CGIAR’s mission crisis, financial sustainability, 
and global versus national focus, provide the backdrop in which 
China’s engagement unfolds. 
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3 China’s international engagements and ‘selective learning’
Since the turn of the century, China’s internationalisation 
intensified as part of a ‘going out’ strategy, which encouraged 
Chinese enterprises to do business abroad (Alden 2007; Wang 
2016). Trade and foreign direct investment with other developing 
nations have seen unprecedented expansion (Tang 2020). This 
is illustrated by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a transport 
and communications infrastructure development programme of 
global scale, launched in 2013 to help developing nations grow 
while improving China’s access to resources and markets within a 
‘win–win’ framework. Although there have been concerns about 
the BRI’s impact on developing countries’ debt and environmental 
sustainability (Teo et al. 2019; Were 2018), China’s White Paper 
on international cooperation sees it as a ‘major platform for 
international development cooperation’ and the ‘significant 
public goods China offers to the whole world’ (SCIO 2021: 7).
Technology trade and scientific and technical cooperation 
have long been important elements of China’s South–South 
relations (Brautigam 1998). These include placements for Chinese 
experts in developing countries, through bilateral cooperation 
or via organisations such as UNDP or the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Furthermore, the 
2006 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) launched 
Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centres (ATDCs) 
(Brautigam and Tang 2009), offering a hybrid of aid and business 
through public–private partnerships combining state provision of 
public goods with private management for financial sustainability 
(Tang et al. 2015; Xu et al. 2016).
So, what defines China’s development cooperation? Debates 
often frame the Chinese model as the ‘Beijing Consensus’, in 
opposition to the ‘Washington Consensus’ associated with 
neoliberal development policies spearheaded by the Bretton 
Woods institutions (Ramo 2004).5 This framing has been 
challenged as a foreign creation that inaccurately represents 
differences between models and for ‘overstating how far China 
diverges from standard economic theory’ (Kennedy 2010: 
475). The Beijing Consensus thesis has also been criticised for 
misleadingly suggesting the existence of a singular China model. 
Tang (2020) argues that China’s international engagements have 
shown that there is no generalisable model but that solutions are 
adjusted to contexts in a pragmatic manner. Tang defines this 
approach as ‘co-evolutionary pragmatism’, departing from the 
market–state binary to emphasise distinct pathways towards 
the goal of economic development. Taking development as 
a learning process (Lin and Wang 2008), developing countries 
need to set their own priorities. During the learning process, 
improvisation and innovation are needed to explore solutions 
adapted to local realities in a pragmatic manner, rather than 
following orthodox recipes. The development process is therefore 
not linear but a winding pathway. 
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Our notion of ‘selective learning’ captures the emphasis on 
development ownership and pragmatic development. These 
two ideas originate from China’s own trajectory and its own 
process of learning from the international community and are 
now embedded in China’s development policy and discourse. The 
emphasis on ownership links to the diplomacy of non-interference 
and Southern self-reliance that originated at the 1955 Bandung 
Conference on South–South solidarity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and 
Tafira 2018). China is also sensitive to external interference due to 
its prior experience of dependence from Western powers in the 
nineteenth century. It thus avoids imposing on other countries 
what it does not want for itself.6 
While the extent to which these principles hold in practice has 
been debated (Aidoo and Hess 2015; Okolo 2015; Po and Sims 
2021; Verhoeven 2014), China’s White Paper on international 
cooperation emphasises ‘respecting each other as equals’ as a 
guiding principle (SCIO 2021: 7). Also, the principle of ‘providing the 
means for independent development’ conveys similar meaning 
and highlights self-reliance through learning via joint work and 
capacity-building activities such as the training of talent and 
technicians ‘to empower them to tap their own potential for 
diversified, independent and sustainable development’ (ibid.: 8). 
China’s pragmatic development means working with partners 
to advance economic development with no pre-established 
blueprint and ‘regardless of whether its [partner] political regime 
is authoritarian or democratic’ (Aidoo and Hess 2015: 110). In this, 
China is seen as differing from Western development approaches 
that often seek to reform socio-political systems in partner 
countries (Gu, Li and Zhang, this IDS Bulletin). Tang argues that 
‘China was able to develop by promoting market economy and 
international trade while maintaining a sociopolitical system 
different from the West’ and this experience informs its approach 
when engaging with other Southern nations. Hence, the pathway 
can be varied provided it leads to the ultimate goal: ‘It doesn’t 
matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches 
mice’ (Tang 2020: 7, citing Deng Xiaoping).
The combination of development ownership/self-reliance and 
pragmatic development, or ‘selective learning’, is an approach 
that has defined China’s own domestic development process 
(and how it learned from other countries) and now informs its 
international engagements with other countries and institutions. 
Xu and Li talk about a ‘closing-gap experience sharing’ approach 
in China–Africa relations, which entails promoting ‘heuristic 
learning under equal relationship between peers and shaping a 
new image of African development’ (2020: 117).7
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4 Half a century of China’s engagement with the CGIAR in 
two stages 
In China, the CGIAR is regarded as an international reference 
for agricultural science and technology. Chinese officials and 
scientists often refer to it as the ‘World Academy of Agricultural 
Sciences’, the international equivalent of the Chinese Academy 
of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS), the prestigious science institution 
that formally hosted CGIAR centres in the country.
The interaction between China and the CGIAR started in the 
1970s, although this was only formalised in 1984 when China 
became a member. China currently holds Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoUs) with 13 CGIAR centres, and seven of these 
currently have registered offices in China.
Over this past half century, China’s interaction with the CGIAR has 
undergone two main stages. The first stage corresponds to the 
period between the 1970s and 1990s, when China was primarily 
a recipient of international agricultural science resources and 
expertise. The CGIAR provided significant contributions to China, 
particularly for non-staple crop research. These contributions 
intensified during China’s market-oriented reforms, from the early 
1980s. The second stage started in the new century, particularly 
after 2007–08, when the CGIAR initiated structural reforms and 
China increased its financial contributions. In this current stage, 
China has become more active and assertive by setting up a 
coordination office, establishing joint laboratories, and initiating 
joint programmes (Cabral, Pandey and Xu 2021). The following 
sections outline this trajectory.
4.1 Stage one: China as recipient of expertise and resources 
In the early 1970s, a Chinese delegation participated in a 
FAO-hosted conference in Manila where the President of the 
Philippines showcased seeds developed by IRRI. Germplasm 
exchanges between China and the CGIAR began to sprout. With 
the inspiration of hybrid practices and its benefits, the three-line 
indica hybrid rice was completed in 1973 by Yuan Longping and 
his team,8 and the hybrid rice production system was formally 
established. Productivity for hybrid rice was 10 per cent higher 
than for conventional rice, resulting in a qualitative leap for China’s 
rice industry. The introduction of wheat, potato, corn, and other 
crop varieties greatly increased the average output of food crops 
and set the foundations for the breeding of China’s main crops. 
Scientific cooperation started off from personal connections 
established during those early visits. A delegation from the 
CAAS visited CIMMYT for the first time in 1974 and an IRRI 
delegation travelled to China in 1976. In 1977, IRRI and the 
Chinese Ministry of Agriculture signed an MoU and the CAAS 
and IRRI jointly convened a biennial meeting for germplasm 
exchange. Institutional cooperation comprised crop improvement, 
biotechnology, integrated pest management, natural resource 
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management, rice field environmental monitoring, farming 
systems, information exchanges, and training. In 1982, IRRI and the 
CAAS launched a collaborative research and training programme. 
In 1983, a Chinese delegation participated in the CGIAR annual 
meeting and China became a member the following year. 
During this first period, collaborations between CGIAR centres 
and China comprised germplasm resource exchange and training 
Chinese scientists. Through these collaborations, the Chinese 
government encouraged the modernisation of domestic research 
systems and gradually transformed sporadic exchanges into 
institutionalised platforms for cooperation.
4.2 Stage two: China as partner and contributor
In the second stage, China’s engagement with the CGIAR 
changed from being a recipient to becoming a more active 
partner and contributor. This coincides with a significant increase in 
China’s financial contributions, particularly from 2007 (see Figure 1), 
in a context of sustained economic growth (Vincelette et al. 2010). 
China gradually developed closer and broader cooperation with 
the CGIAR, mainly through: (1) the establishment of a joint laboratory 
system with the CAAS; and (2) the launch of a joint agricultural 
science and technology programme with the National Natural 
Science Foundation of China (NSFC)9 (Han, Yan and Wang 2018). 
Source Authors’ own, based on information provided by a CGIAR respondent in an interview, Beijing, 2020. 
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Several CGIAR centres set up offices in China (CAAS 2017). Also, 
the NSFC and CIMMYT signed a cooperation agreement in 1999 
and, between 2001 and 2007, NSFC–CGIAR research projects 
increased from seven to 17 (Han et al. 2018). 
This stage is also marked by a problem-focused approach, 
reflecting China’s pragmatic and more targeted engagement 
with international research, which resulted in cooperation 
between CGIAR centres and local academies of agricultural 
sciences to address challenges in China. For example, in 2004, 
CIAT, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and 
the CAAS jointly developed the ‘China Crop Nutrition Fortification 
Project’ to promote the cultivation of high-β-carotene sweet 
potatoes and high-zinc wheat in Sichuan, Chongqing City, and 
other regions: varieties such as ‘Zhongmai 175’ and high-speed 
rice ‘Zhongguangxiang No. 1’ sought to address nutritional 
deficiencies in poor areas. In 2008, following a devastating 
earthquake in Sichuan province, the International Potato 
Center (CIP), the CAAS, the Sichuan Academy of Agricultural 
Sciences, the Heilongjiang Academy of Agricultural Sciences, 
and other scientific institutions implemented the ‘Sichuan 
Potato Post-Disaster Aid Project’. This introduced and promoted 
new varieties, such as virus-free seed potatoes,10 and new 
technologies, such as mist culture,11 which enabled the Sichuan 
potato industry to recover.
With the backdrop of the CGIAR reform, the establishment of 
the China–CIP Center for Asia and the Pacific (CCCAP) in 2008 
illustrates a transition towards a more high-level, coordinated, 
and outward-looking mode of engagement by Chinese 
institutions. After the CGIAR reform was completed in 2011, 
the NSFC co-funded research with five CGIAR centres. In 2012, the 
NSFC and the CGIAR signed a framework agreement that now 
covers all 15 CGIAR centres and focuses on cooperation with the 
CGIAR’s core research areas in a coordinated fashion, in line with 
the One CGIAR initiative.12 
Over this second period, Chinese scientists became involved in 
CGIAR governance. Three Chinese senior scientists have served 
as members of the CGIAR Executive Council, and 15 have taken 
on the role of director of CGIAR centres.13
5 China–CGIAR cooperation and new South–South platforms
To further illustrate the evolving China–CGIAR interaction, we 
consider three modalities of cooperation: germplasm exchanges, 
training of talent, and institutionalised platforms for collaboration. 
We discuss the consolidation of selective learning, where Chinese 
scientists emerge as partners standing on equal footing with their 
international peers at CGIAR centres, and where these platforms 
increasingly serve as mechanisms for transfer of expertise from 
China to other countries in the global South.
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5.1 Germplasm exchange
Germplasm exchange marks the beginning of China–CGIAR 
relations and constitutes a pillar of China’s modern agricultural 
science system. Following the early visit of the Chinese delegation 
to the Philippines, IRRI provided rice genetic resources to China, 
several of which have been actively promoted in China.14 At 
present, 90 per cent of hybrid rice in China uses IRRI’s restoring 
genes (International Cooperation Bureau of CAAS 2008). Besides 
rice, China obtained germplasm resources from various CGIAR 
centres for crops, which laid the foundations for breeding China’s 
main crops, such as high-lysine corn, hybrid sorghum, peanuts, 
and high-quality wheat (ibid.). 
China has also provided germplasm resources to CGIAR centres 
(ibid.). Between 1981 and 2000, China donated 7,778 copies of 
Chinese rice landraces and 35 copies of wild rice to the IRRI 
bank. The China National Rice Research Institute (CNRRI) and 
12 provincial Academies of Agricultural Sciences have also 
participated in the International Network for Genetic Evaluation 
of Rice (INGER) and, over the past 20 years, Chinese scientists 
have been involved in evaluating more than 18,000 rice 
germplasms around the world. 
5.2 Training of talent
The CGIAR has contributed to the formation of Chinese scientists. 
Since the 1980s, many Chinese scientists were trained at CGIAR 
centres, and later became the backbone of agricultural scientific 
research, teaching, and management. Some scholars have not 
only made contributions to agricultural science and technology, 
but have also worked on the development of agricultural policy in 
China and abroad through international cooperation. 
Taking IRRI as an example, this CGIAR centre signed an MoU 
with the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture in 1977 and began 
collaborating with the CAAS from 1982 on research and training. 
Between 1984 and 2008, IRRI supported the participation of 
700 Chinese scientists in international conferences, seminars, and 
training (International Cooperation Bureau of CAAS 2008). It also 
provided postgraduate training to 105 Chinese students, and 
non-degree training to 225. In addition, IRRI scientists conducted 
more than 500 visits to China and engaged in collaborative 
research and teaching activities in China. Renowned Chinese 
rice scientists, such as Yuan Longping, Xie Huaan, and 
He Cheng Jian, spent time working at IRRI at different points in 
their careers.
China’s hybrid rice achievements encapsulate the efforts 
of generations of Chinese scientists and the significance of 
international collaborations with the CGIAR. In the mid-1970s, 
China was the first country to successfully cultivate hybrid rice 
under temperate conditions (Tang and Ding 2002). Between 1986 
and 1996, ‘Shanyou 63’ was the main rice variety planted in China, 
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which covered a total of 52.7m ha in 1996 (Xie and Zheng 1996). 
Although the yields success of ‘Shanyou 63’ is seen as the 
result of several factors (including the use of agrochemicals), 
studies highlight the role played by scientific research on crop 
improvement and germplasm exchanges with IRRI (Cheng and 
Liao 1998; Xie and Zheng 1996). 
These achievements contributed to a more confident 
engagement of Chinese scientists in international knowledge 
networks. As a result, Chinese institutions gradually adopted 
a more active stance in the construction of platforms for 
collaboration and reciprocal training. For example, the Asian 
Rice Biotechnology Network (ARBN) comprises IRRI, China, and 
four other countries. Also, Chinese scientists cooperated with 
IRRI to establish the International Rice Information System (IRIS), 
which provides germplasm parent and pedigree information. The 
extension of these knowledge networks builds on the gradual 
deepening of cooperation between China and the CGIAR and 
the growing contribution of Chinese scientists. Wang Ren, the 
first CGIAR Secretary-General of Chinese nationality, highlighted 
China’s role in scientific cooperation:
It is difficult for us to have the opportunity and conditions to 
express Chinese ideas and influence on major issues related 
to the development of international agriculture. The Chinese 
people should play a greater role on the world stage.  
(Duan 2008: 23–5) 
But only recently has the capacity development of Chinese 
scientists become institutionalised. The CGIAR earmarks part 
of the donations from the Chinese government for training and 
capacity building. The CAAS and the CGIAR have implemented 
an exchange programme that places Chinese scientists with 
CGIAR centres on a regular basis.15 This not only improves the 
CAAS’s capacity but also promotes collaborative projects. In 
recognition of the CGIAR’s contribution, the Chinese government 
issued ‘Friendship Awards’ to 11 CGIAR scientists and two centres 
between 1998 and 2001 (CIMMYT and IRRI).
The NSFC and the China Scholarship Council have also 
cooperated with the CGIAR on training. The China Scholarship 
Council signed an MoU with CIMMYT and IRRI for joint 
scholarships to sponsor Chinese scholars (about ten scientists 
annually). The CGIAR and the NSFC also hold an international 
cooperation agreement for joint research projects.
Training programmes have, therefore, become normalised, 
institutionalised, and widespread. There is also growing interest 
in creating opportunities for collaborative research between 
Chinese scientific institutions and IARCs.
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5.3 Institutionalised platforms for international collaboration
China has become a more active contributor and partner of 
CGIAR centres since the turn of the century, as illustrated by 
the establishment of joint laboratories with CAAS institutes and 
collaborative research involving the NSFC. These are now leading 
to further collaborations with China’s Southern partners (see 
Section 5.4).
Since 1999, the CGIAR and the CAAS have established a joint 
laboratory system to carry out collaborative research and 
technology extension. Ten joint laboratories were created with the 
eight research centres with offices in China (CAAS 2017). 
The new mode of engagement entails collaborative research, 
as illustrated by the NSFC–CGIAR framework agreement. 
This emerged from the High-Level Forum on China–CGIAR 
cooperation hosted by the Ministry of Agriculture in Beijing in 1997. 
In 1999, the NSFC and CIMMYT signed a cooperation agreement 
for the first time, resulting in collaborative projects.16 This led to 
further agreements involving IRRI and, later, the International 
Center for Biodiversity. After the CGIAR reform was completed 
in 2011, the NSFC jointly funded seven projects with five CGIAR 
centres. In 2012, the NSFC and the CGIAR reached a consensus on 
signing the NSFC–CGIAR framework agreement, which came into 
effect in 2013. Priority funding areas are jointly determined, and the 
review, approval, and management of projects is the responsibility 
of the Chinese side. Chinese scientists and technicians operate 
as project hosts and the CGIAR collaborates by jointly submitting 
project applications. The NSFC provides scientific research and 
personnel exchange funds for approved projects, whereas CGIAR 
centres provide financial support for the participation of CGIAR 
personnel and for training and learning (Han et al. 2018).
These spaces are part of an effort from China’s research 
organisations to have a more institutionalised and coordinated 
interaction with the CGIAR. The opening of CGIAR offices in 
Beijing brought to light high transaction costs and coordination 
gaps between different centres, as well as their limited practical 
contributions to contemporary China’s agricultural challenges. 
In the early days, CGIAR centres played a key role in 
introducing new technologies and training scientists, yet now 
their comparative advantages have been greatly reduced 
in China’s context. They increasingly focus on meetings, 
delivering presentations and writing papers. It looks fancy, 
yet the work effectiveness and outcomes are limited. It has 
become increasingly bureaucratic and over-burdened. 
(Interview with staff member at CGIAR centre, Beijing, 2020)
Joint laboratories and framework agreements reflect the efforts 
to make these interactions more strategic and effective for China, 
and learning more selective from international organisations.
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5.4 New South–South connections and knowledge platforms
International research collaborations have provided fertile ground 
for Chinese research systems to mature. Chinese experts are now 
engaging in South–South scientific cooperation, building new 
knowledge platforms based on their experiences with the CGIAR. 
One example of new platforms is the CCCAP, which is expected 
to push forward joint research and extension on potatoes in 
China and the Asia-Pacific region (Lu and Xiu 2014). Furthermore, 
the CGIAR–CAAS joint laboratories provide not only a space 
for the continuation of training Chinese talent, but are also 
becoming channels for China to offer training and develop other 
collaborations and knowledge networks with Southern partners. 
China is also establishing additional international joint research 
centres and overseas bases, drawing on other international 
industry–university research networks. In June 2019, the Chinese 
Ministry of Science and Technology approved the first batch of 
14 Belt and Road joint laboratories, including six in agricultural 
research.
China has extended the joint research model to China–Africa 
cooperation, assisting the construction of the Sino–Africa 
Joint Research Center (SAJOREC) and establishing a ‘10+10’ 
cooperation mechanism for China–Africa agricultural science.17 
Since its establishment in 2013, SAJOREC has proposed more than 
45 joint research projects across a range of themes, including 
biodiversity, pathogenic microorganism detection, remote 
sensing, and natural resource management (SAJOREC n.d.). It has 
also provided scholarships for African students to study in China 
and training for scientists and senior technicians from across 
Africa (ibid.). 
China has also set up a national research plan and special 
projects dedicated to supporting international scientific and 
technological cooperation. The aim is to enhance capacity 
to facilitate global innovation, meeting the global goals while 
promoting the participation of Chinese businesses in international 
cooperation.
6 Conclusion
This article has reviewed the interaction between China and 
the CGIAR over the past 50 years and identified two stages 
in this relationship. The first stage features China largely as a 
recipient of resources and expertise, particularly in the context 
of market-oriented reforms (in China) and greater international 
exposure. During this formative stage, the interaction comprised 
germplasm exchanges, cultivation of new crop varieties in China, 
and training and mentoring of Chinese scientists. The second 
stage has unfolded in a context of China’s economic ascendency 
and intensified contributions to global development (Alden 2007; 
Carmody 2013). During this stage, there has been a gradual 
assertion of Chinese scientists and scientific institutions within 
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the CGIAR (at a time of stagnant CGIAR funding), as well as in 
other international spaces through new Southern platforms for 
collaboration. China’s more active and strategic engagement 
with the CGIAR fits a trend towards increasingly earmarked CGIAR 
funding. This is also happening alongside intensifying South–
South cooperation activities (Mawdsley 2012; Scoones et al. 2016).
Over this period, we can trace the formation and practice of 
China’s ‘selective learning’ in agricultural science, followed by its 
extension to other countries through South–South cooperation. 
Selective learning is defined by emphases in ownership (or 
self-reliance) and pragmatic development that have long guided 
China’s own trajectory (Tang 2020). The approach emerged from 
interacting with international organisations, such as the CGIAR 
centres. In the first stage, China’s selective learning entailed 
an emphasis on the training of talent (who would later lead 
research projects and institutions) and focused on germplasm 
exchanges, on the basis of which China gradually developed 
its national agricultural research system. In the second stage, 
when China began to actively ‘go out’, the principle of selective 
learning meant being more entrepreneurial and proactive 
in research collaborations, aligning these with China’s own 
challenges, and building on accumulated competences and 
knowledge. China’s pursuit of development ownership is visible 
in the push for more problem-driven cooperation, in line with 
the country’s needs. Pragmatic development is reflected, in turn, 
in the joint laboratories with CGIAR centres and collaborative 
projects that are geared towards an exploration of multiple 
pathways to economic development, and which establish new 
knowledge spaces involving multiple players, including diplomats, 
bureaucrats, and businesses, for scientific and technological 
innovation. The White Paper on international cooperation 
states that science and technology are the ‘primary productive 
forces’ and a key element in supporting endogenous growth by 
developing countries (SCIO 2021: 40). These global science and 
technology initiatives are being extended to include Southern 
knowledge networks and spaces, diversifying the existing 
international development regime and knowledge pool. 
While links to prestigious and well-established knowledge 
networks such as the CGIAR centres continue to be highly prized 
spaces for the formation of Chinese talent and cutting-edge 
knowledge production, China is also enabling the construction 
of new platforms for collaborative scientific research and 
technological innovation together with other nations. While these 
build on the learnings of five decades of collaboration with the 
CGIAR, they bring on board Southern partners and connections, 
convened by Chinese scientists and research institutions in their 
own right.
It is too early to say whether these new initiatives will lead 
to a reconfiguration of global agricultural research systems 
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and knowledge networks. Further research should explore the 
extent to which China’s heightened international engagement 
and domestic capability is transforming established systems 
and opening up new pathways for global agricultural science, 
including creating channels in the South for the circulation of 
ideas, and the exchange of people and germplasm resources. 
Drawing implications for international cooperation relations, our 
analysis suggests that foreign assistance, if well selected and 
adapted to specific needs of recipient countries, can contribute 
to building their domestic capabilities and enable the choice 
of development trajectories that suit them. China as a South–
South cooperation provider emphasises partner ownership and 
self-sufficiency through capacity development that can enable 
endogenous development trajectories. How China’s ‘selective 
learning’ is interpreted by other Southern countries and whether 
it is taken up as a distinctive approach to development learning 
that they can apply on their own terms are questions that 
warrant further investigation.
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3 Yingdan Cao, PhD candidate, College of Humanities and 
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4 The first meeting of the CGIAR, held in May 1971, listed the 
following countries and organisations as members: Canada, 
Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, the African Development Bank, FAO, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction 
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and Development (the World Bank), the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), Ford Foundation, the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the Kellogg 
Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation (CGIAR 1971).
5 Ramo’s notion of the Beijing Consensus centres on three 
presumably distinctive and central features of China’s 
economic model: (1) innovation-based development; 
(2) economic success measured not by growth alone but 
by equitable distribution of wealth and environmental 
sustainability; and (3) self-determination vis-à-vis the United 
States’ hegemony. 
6 As Confucius put it: ‘Do not impose on others what you yourself 
do not desire’.
7 Specifically, this approach comprises three elements: (1) drawing 
on experiences already practised; (2) mobilising actors that 
worked directly with those experiences to find solutions with 
local partners to tackle on-site development challenges; and 
(3) peer-to-peer experience sharing (Xu and Li 2020).
8 The successful completion of the ‘three-line’ hybrid rice was 
the result of years of research by a team of Chinese scientists 
led by Yuan Longping. The three-line matching system was 
announced as successful at the National Rice Scientific 
Research Conference in 1973. 
9 The NSFC is the organisation responsible for coordinating 
funding to support basic research and foster scientific talent, 
and ultimately promote progress in science and technology for 
China’s socioeconomic development. Since 2018, the NSFC sits 
under the Ministry of Science and Technology.
10 This refers to the virus-free or rarely virus-infected seed potato 
obtained after implementing a series of technical measures to 
remove the virus in the potato block. It has the advantages of 
early maturity, high yield, and good quality.
11 Mist culture is a new type of soil-less cultivation. It uses a spray 
device to atomise the nutrient solution into small droplets, 
which are directly applied to plant roots to provide water and 
nutrients.
12 One CGIAR is an internal initiative to promote greater 
integration across CGIAR centres in recognition of the 
interconnectedness of sustainable development challenges.
13 For example, Wang Ren was the Deputy Director General of 
IRRI in 2000–07 and Shenggen Fan was the Director General of 
IFPRI in 2009–19.
14 IR varieties from IRRI (such as IR24, IR26, IR30, IR50, IR64,  
IR9761-19-1) have become the most important restorer lines and 
parents of hybrid rice in China.
15 In 2019 alone, these included placements with CIMMYT, IFPRI, 
the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), World 
Agroforestry (ICRAF), and Biodiversity International (interview 
with staff member at a CGIAR centre, Beijing, 2020).
16 The NSFC Life Sciences Department subsidises about 
35 projects on rice physiology, nutrition, pathology, genetics, 
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